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Update Criminal Law & Procedure 
DAVID E. VANDERCOY* 
BRUCE G. BERNER** 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court of the United States remained extremely active 
accepting and deciding criminal issues with constitutional dimension and, 
therefore, with implications for state criminal practice. The strong trend 
of these decisions is to strengthen law enforcement; constitutional pro-
tections are· clearly contracting. Although the subject matter mix was 
refreshingly eclectic, the Fourth Amendment, confessions, habeas corpus, 
and the death penalty continued to occupy a large share of the Court's 
time. Surprisingly, the Confrontation Clause, the subject of much recent 
Court activity, was not addressed this past term. However, the Indiana 
Supreme Court issued important decisions in the confrontation area as 
well as in many others. Several significant statutory developments in the 
substantive crime area will also be discussed. 
I. SUBSTANTIVE 
A. Burglary 
Both the Indiana ·courts and legislature were active in the burglary 
area. The cases continued to explore the question of when a building 
is a udwelling,'' a circumstance that elevates burglary from a Class C 
felony to a Class B. 1 In Ferrell v. Stat& the supreme court held that 
• Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. 
•• Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Valparaiso University School of Law. 
1. The common-law fonnulation of burglary (and arson) embraced only dwellings. 
To break and enter a building other than a dwelling was simply not burglary, though it 
may have been some lesser offense. This was no mere quibble over semantics. The particular 
. 
evil at which the crime of burglary was aimed was the intrusion into the sacred space 
of the habitation. It was not a property crime; it was the threat to personal safety and 
the sanctity of the habitation which was breached. "A person's home is his castle" fairly 
depicts the idea. A person's store, warehouse, or office were his property, to be sure, 
but not his castle. Slowly, especially in America, burglary was broadened to include all 
sorts of buildings and structures, sometimes even automobiles. Whether tha:t development 
was even coherent is a question of some complexity, but there is no doubting that it 
happened and that Indiana has followed that development by broadening the subjects of 
burglary to include buildings and structures of all sorts. Recognizing the greater dangers 
and affront inherent in house intrusions, Indiana elevated a breaking and entry of a 
dwelling to a Class B felony. See IND. ConE § 3S-43-2-1 (1988) (burglary); id. § 35-41-
1-10 (definition of "dwelling,'). 
2. 565 N.E.2d 1070 (Ind. 1991). 
.. 
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a building remained an occupant's3 ''dwelling" even though he had not 
slept there for four months. 4 The victim did maintain an address and 
phone at that location and visited the house on a regular basis. This 
was sufficient contact to treat the building as his dwelling. In Brown 
v. State,5 the victims physically relocated to another house, but maintained 
the right of occupancy and in fact, left personal items in the house. 
Again, this was held sufficient contact so that the building was still 
legally, if not factually, their ''dwelling.' ' 6 
In Indiana Code 35-43-2-1.5 the legislature created a new crime, 
Residential Entry: ''A person who knowingly or intentionally breaks and 
enters the dwelling of another person commits residential entry, a Class 
D felony.'' 7 This statute was prompted presumably by problems of proof 
in certain housebreaking scenarios. The Indiana Burglary Statute8 requires 
proof that the defendant entered with the intent to commit a felony. 
Often the state will have proof that the defendant broke and entered 
a house without consent, but the defendant takes the position either 
that he intended no target crime at all or that the target crime is a 
misdemeanor.9 The new statute permits prosecution for a felony (Class 
3. Burglary has always been understood as a crime against the occupant, not the 
owner, because the theory of the harm was not property centered but privacy centered. 
4. Ferrell, 565 N .E.2d at 1072. 
S. 580 N .. E.2d 329 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). 
6. /d. at 330. The "dwelling" cases all seem bizarre unless one first firmly ftxes 
on the precise harm that the common law understood burglary to perpetrate. Any ordinary 
observer of the buildings in these cases would say, "This is a house. This is a dwelling." 
The common law had, however, no special interest in protecting one type of architecture 
(house) more than others (store, warehouse, etc.). They were all subject to property-
. . . 
centered crimes such as trespass, theft, or vandalism. The crime of burglary protected 
the special, human connection to the place one lived. Of course, threat to physical safety 
in housebreakings was often entailed, but this too was not the heart of the problem. 
Occupants out for the evening or on vacation were still understood to be subject to the 
special harm of outsiders intruding into their space. Indeed, psychologists are familiar 
with cases in which people can no longer Jive in their homes after they have been burglarized. 
What the recent dwelling cases in Indiana are really exploring is: "When does this special 
relationship with the habitational place start and when· does it end?u 
7. IND. CoDE § 35-43-.2-1.5 (Supp. 1991). 
8. IND. CODE § 35-43-2-1 (1988). 
9. Part of the problem here is theft, the most common target crime in burglary. 
Indiana Code § 35-43-4-2, the basic theft statute, has been interpreted to require an intent 
to deprive the owner of the property substantially permanently. See, e.g., Nelson v. State, 
337 N.E.2d 877 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975). Thus, if the defendant claims that he intended to 
take the property temporarily (which, in some cases, is a plausible claim, especially with 
motor vehicles), there is no theft, but only criminal conversion, IND. CODE § 3543-4-3 
(1988), which is only a misdemeanor and thus, does not support burglary. If the prosecutor 
cannot prove an intent to commit theft, the state is left with two misdemeanors-criminal 
trespass, IND. CoDE § 35-43-2-2 (Supp. 1991), and criminal conversion. 
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D) without any requirement of proof of intention to commit a target 
crime,., Of course, if such intention is shown, the crime becomes a Class-
B burglary. 10 
B. Criminal Gangs 
The legislature also enacted Indiana Code 35-45-9, 11 a series of 
provisions on criminal gangs, and amended the RICO statute•z to in-
corporate gang activity. The subject of these provisions is a broad one. 
Any adequate treatment of the legal and constitutional implications of 
such changes is beyond the scope of this Article. Like RICO and 
"organized crime" statutes, the new legislation is an attempt to add 
enforcement weapons in fighting a problem which is proving intractable 
to solution by more conventional penal statutes. Clearly, the question 
of whether these provisions unduly offend First Amendment associational 
rights will have to be addressed.13 
10. Note that the statute does not cover illegal breaking and entry of a building 
other than a dwelling. In such cases, intent to commit a felony will still be necessary to 
convict of Class C burglary. If such intent cannot be proved, the state will be left with 
a misdemeanor prosecution for criminal trespass. Id. 
11. Indiana Code § 35-45"'9 provides as follows: 
Sec. 1. As used in this chapter, "criminal gang" means a group with at 
least five (5) members that specifically: 
(1) either: 
(A) promotes, sponsors, or assists in; or 
(B) participates in; and 
(2) requires, as a c,ondition of membership or continued membership; the 
commission of a felony or an act that would be a felony if committed by an 
adult or the offense of battery. 
Sec. 2. As used in this chapter, uthreatens'" includes a communication 
made with the intent to hann a person or the person's property or any other 
person or the property of another person. 
Sec. 3. A person who knowingly or intentionally actively participates in a 
criminal gang commits criminal gang activity, a Class D felony. 
Sec. 4 .. A person who threatens another person because the other person: 
(1) refuses to join a criminal gang; or 
(2) has withdrawn from a criminal gang; 
commits criminal gang intimidation, a Class C felony. 
12. The criminal RICO statute is Indiana Code § 35-45-6-l, -2 (Supp. 1991). The 
civil RICO statute is Indiana Code § 34·4-30.5-1 to -4.5 (Supp. 1991). 
13. There would be clear constitutional problems in making mere membership in 
a group a crime, especially if the group ·is multi-purposed, if some purposes were legal 
and if liability did not require proof of actual involvement in the illegal purpose$. See, 
e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961). The criminal gangs statute seems to 
be drafted to avoid this difficulty insofar as possible. The- question is whether, because 
it is so tightly drawn, anyone can ever be successfully prosecuted under it. It would seem, 
at least, to be difficult to obtain proof that a gang actually conditions membership on 
• 
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II. ARREsT, SEARCH, & SEIZURE 
The most important Fourth Amendment decisions of the past term 
dealt with the parameters of the ''seizure" of a person, a topic the 
United States Supreme Court had not addressed directly for several years. 
Both decisions clearly forward a law enforcement agenda. 
In California v. Hodari D.14 and Florida v. Bostick,15 the Court 
dramatically changed the understanding of the initial phase .of the police-
suspect confrontation. Prior to Hodari D., the principal question in-
volving whether a suspect had been "seized'' was whether an objectively 
reasonable person would "feel free to Ieave."16 This could be ·proved 
either by proof that the police physically restrained the suspect or engaged 
in shows of authority clearly signalling compulsion and not a voluntary 
conversation. The focus was on police conduct. Hodari D., a seven to 
two decision, adds a new aspect, because now the "seizure" question 
depends, in part, .on the suspect's reaction to the police. The police, 
concededly with neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion, engaged 
in a chase of Hodari D,., and others. There is no question that the police 
clearly signalled an intention to detain him without his voluntary consent. 
As he ran, he tossed away an object which later proved to be crack 
cocaine,. The admissibility of that evidence was a.rgued to be a ''fruit 
of the poisonous tree'' seizure. The Court held that Hodari had not 
yet been seized and redefined a seizure to mean (a) the application of 
physical restraint (a touching) or (b) a show of authority or force to 
which the suspect yields.l1 Thus, until the suspect is caught or submits 
to the authority, no seizure has taken place. Thus, the abandonment 
of the cocaine was not the product of a seizure as none had yet taken 
place. The old definition of not feeling "free to leave" remains as a 
necessary aspect of this second type of seizure; it is, however, not 
sufficient. The dissent worried about the potential for abuse. Police may 
now engage in a ''threatening, but sufficiently slow chase'' to prompt 
various behaviors from suspects without needing any level of suspicion 
to do so.18 
In Bostick, the suspect clearly submitted to the police; thus, the 
Hodari D. issue was not presented. Attention focused on the anterior 
active participation in felonies .. Groups such as this ordinarily do not have written charters~ 
The purpose for the, statute is understandable. The question is whether it successfully 
navigates between the Scylla of First Amendment difficulty and the Charibdis of requiring 
more proof than can be obtained. 
14. 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991). 
15.. 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991). _ 
16., See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980). 
17. Hodari, 111 S. Ct. at 1552. 
18!0 ld. at 1559' (quoting 3 WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.'2, at 61 (2d 
ed. 1987 & Supp. 1991)). 
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question: How much police behavior constitutes a sufficient show of 
authority so that the suspect does not objectively believe he is free to 
leave or ignore the police? Florida police were ''working the buses," a 
procedure which entails boarding public buses during layovers and asking 
everyone (or some subgroup of people in some cases) to answer questions, 
present identification, and often, to consent to a search of their carry-
on or stored luggage. Two unifor1ned, badged, armed police approached 
Bostick, positioned themselves in the aisle between Bostick and the door, 
and after preliminary questioning, asked him to consent to a search of 
his luggage. He did so and the search disclosed cocaine. Because he so 
clearly submitted to the police, the Hodari D. question was not presented. 
Rather, the court held that the police conduct was not a seizure because 
a reasonable person would not feel compelled to submit to such a 
request. 19 The Court noted that any failure to cooperate could not be 
used as the basis for any probable cause or reasonable suspicion. 20 The 
dissent argued that the average traveler does not know this to be true 
and that the conduct of the police in this case was rife with compulsion. 21 
The case is complicated by the fact that bus travelers are not ''free to 
leave'' the bus in the same way that a suspect approached on the street 
is free to leave. 
T'he combination of Hodari D. and Bostick presents a Hobson's 
choice to a suspect confronted by police who have no lawful right to 
arrest or stop him. Bostick requires great fortitude to withstand marginally 
coercive tactics, yet Hodari D. makes anything the suspect says or does 
not the product of a seizure and thus, usable against him to support 
further police inferences. The third choice is to submit ''voluntarily" 
as did Bostick. 
In Florida v. Jimeno,22 the Court held that consent to search a car 
includes consent to open any containers within the car in which the 
19. Id. at 1557. 
20. ld. at 1556·57. 
21. Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2389 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). The 
majority argues that any pressure against leaving is not of police origin. If a suspect does 
not mind missing his bus (a matter about which the police are presumably indifferent), 
he is "free to leave!' The dissent points out that "working the buses, is a technique 
designed to exploit the very fact that the suspect has his own reasons for not exiting the 
situation. It seems that this debate is an illustration of the limitation of language. When 
the Court first penned "free to leave,, it was dealing with situatiQns in which the suspect 
was walking, driving, or otherwise going somewhere. To be free of the police contact 
was to "leave." Had the first case arose in the suspect's home, "free to leave" \vould 
hardly have been chosen .. When the issue arises in situations like Bostick, \Vhen what the 
suspect wants is to *'stay" and have the police "leave," one needs to get behind the 
words of a doctrine to its function. What if the police hounded a suspect sitting or lying 
in a hospital emergency room and claimed that he wast after all, free to leave? 
22. 111 S. Ct. 1801 (1991). 
•. 
' 
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sought item could be located. 23 Therefore,- the defendant could not 
complain that following his consent to search his car for controlled 
substances, the police opened a brown paper bag which contained cocaine. 
The Court distinguished this situation from one in which the police, 
having received consent to search a car's trunk, pried open a locked 
briefcase in the trunk.24 There, the Court reasoned that a policeman 
could not reasonably believe that the consenter meant to authorize such 
conduct.25 
California v. Acevedo26 overrules Arkansas v. Sanders21 and United 
States v. Chadwick,28 wherein the so-called Chadwick-Sanders rule was 
developed. Police in Acevedo had probable cause that a paper bag being 
carried by a suspect contained controlled substances. The police waited 
until the suspect reached his car and placed the bag in the car, then 
detained the suspect, searched the bag, and found the evidence. Although 
it has long been true that automobile searches upon probable cause can 
be conducted without a warrant29 and that such a search could extend 
to all containers within the vehicle, 30 the Chadwick-Sanders rule held 
that when probable cause was directed not to the car generally but to 
a particular container in a car, the police could not wait until that 
container was deposited in the car and then employ the automobile 
exception.31 The Court rejected Chadwick-Sanders as anomalous. The-
dissent noted that the potential for abuse was high because the police, 
had they seized the bag before it was put in the car, would have needed 
a warrant.32 
The case of County a/Riverside v. McLaughlin33 further elaborates 
on the requirement of Gerstein v. Pugh, 34 which held that an arrestee 
held without an arrest warrant is entitled to a prompt determination of 
probable cause.35 McLaughlin progresses toward defining ~'prompt.'' The 
23~ Id. at 1804. 
24. Id. 
25. I d. (citing State v. Wells, 110 -S. Ct. 554 (1990)). 
26. 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991). 
27. 442 u.s .. 753 (1979) 
28. 433 U ~S. 1 (1977). 
29. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
30. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
31. The idea, of course, is that if the police could not search a container without 
a warrant when it was outside the car, the police should not be permitted to wait until 
it is placed in a car and then claim the exigency of the mobility of the vehicle to avoid 
the warrant requirement. 
32. California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1995 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
33. 111 S. Ct .. 1661 (1991). 
34. 420 u.s. 103 (1975). 
35. Id. at 118. 
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Court held that this determination (which may be ex parte)36 must occur 
''as soon as reasonably feasible, but in no event later than 48 hours 
after arrest.''37 The case resolved a division among the circuits~ some 
of which had followed a forty-eight hour rule and some of which 
(including the Seventh Court) had required a prompter finding. The 
decision makes it absolutely clear that intervening weekends or holidays 
are insufficient reasons for not complying with the forty-eight hour rule, 
but other ''extraordinary circumstances'_'_ might be.38 
As a practical matter, it should be noted that while many states 
~ombine the probable cause determination with other procedural events 
(arraignment, presentment, or bail hearing), nothing requires them to 
do so. Thus, in weekend or holiday situations when these other pro-
ceedings cannot occur within forty-eight hours, the Fourth Amendment 
is satisfied with a post-arrest warrant issued by a neutral magistrate 
following the same process as a pre-arrest warrant. 
Indiana courts also devoted much of their time to Fourth Amendment 
issues. In Smith v. State,39 the Indiana Supreme Court reviewed facts 
generating issues calling for refinement of the doctrine of a 1990 case, 
Maryland v. Buie~40 Buie permitted, incidental to arrest in a house, a 
''protective sweep'' of the house to protect police from incipient danger 
from accomplices, sympathizers, and others.41 The police in Smith made. 
such a sweep and then entered a locked storeroom and found drying 
marijuana. The Indiana Supreme Court held that because there was no 
evidence that the room immediately adjoine,d the locus of arrest so that 
an attack on officers could be launched therefrom, and because no 
specific and articulable facts demonstrating any reasonable suspicion of 
danger existed, this entry did not fall within the Buie exception. 42 Once 
the defendant is -arrested and the immediate danger past, the police may 
36. Applications for arrest warrants made prior to physical arrest have always, of 
course, been ex parte. Gerstein, as a Fourth Amendment case, never imposed anything 
more than a requirement of a warrant in cases in which the physical arrest was made 
without one as a condition precedent for holding the arrestee for any longer than was 
necessary for administrative processing. The Gerstein requirement, thus, should not be 
confused with other procedural requirements to prove probabl~ cause at other stages of 
the formal judicial process. This confusion is prompted because many jurisdictions have 
chosen to satisfy the Gerstein requirement by amalgamating it with some other step in 
that process, such as presentment (preliminary arraignment). 
37. McLaughlin, Ill S. Ct. at 1671. 
38. ld .. 
39. 565 N.E.2d 1059 (Ind. 1991). 
40. 494 u.s. 325 (1990). 
4t. Id. at 3.36. 
42. Smith, 565 N.E.2d at 1063. 
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search, under the search-incident-to-arrest exception, 43 only within the 
rules of Chime/ v. California.44 Beyond the Chime/ scope, police may 
only search further after obtaining a search warrant. 
III. CoNFESSIONS 
The United States Supreme Court decided three cases involving 
confessions, two on the Edwards rule and one on coerced confessions. 
Minnick v. Mississippi45 elaborated further on the much litigated Edwards 
rule. In Edwards v. Arizona,46 the Court held that when a suspect during 
custodial interrogation invokes the right to consult with a lawyer, all 
questioning must cease and may not be reinitiated by the police until 
the suspect consults with an attorney.47 The Minnick case addressed 
whether the prohibition of initiating interrogation continues even after 
a suspect has consulted with counsel. The Court held, 6-2, that it does.48 
Edwards protection requires that a suspect not be interrogated without 
counsel present. Thus, the intervening consultation does not toll the 
Edwards prohibition. Of course, if the suspect initiates the dialogue, the 
Edwards rule has been satisfied and the analysis follows traditional 
Miranda Iines.49 
In McNeil v. Wisconsin,50 the defendant was arrested for robbery. 
At arraignment, he requested a lawyer to represent him. Later, while 
still in custody, he was interrogated on an unrelated murder. The de-
fendant had not invoked Edwards, which would have prevented police-
initiated interrogation on any subject.51 However, he had requested Sixth 
43. The police may have some basis for a warrantless search wholly apart from 
the search-incident-to-arrest theory on which Buie is based. For example, an occupant 
may consent to a search or the presence of others, who present no physical threat to the 
officers but who may destroy evidence, might give police the right to make a warrantless 
search provided they have probable cause of the presence of crime-connected items. See, 
e.g., Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970). 
44. 395 U.S. 752 (1969}. Chime/ permits a search of the arrestee's person and the 
area within his immediate control. 
45. 111 S. Ct. 486 (1990). 
46. 451 u.s. 477 (1981). 
47. The invocation of a lawyer in Edwards must be kept distinct from the procedure 
which follows a suspect's invocation of silence. On invocation of silence, see Michigan 
v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). 
48. Minnier, 111 S. Ct. at 492. 
49. Under the Rehnq uist Court, it is critically important to keep separate the Fifth 
Amendment Miranda line from the Sixth Amendment line of cases springing from Massiah 
v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). This court has interpreted Miranda grudgingly, 
but the Massiah line quite expansively. 
50. Ill S. Ct. 2204 (1991). 
51. See Arizona v. Roberson, 108 S. Ct. 2093 (f988). 
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Amendment counsel at his arraignment which the Court, in Michigan 
v. Jackson,52 seemed to treat as tantamount to an Edwards invocation. 
The McNeil Court held that Jackson did not control this case. 53 Whereas_ 
the Edwards invocation is not offense~sp_ecific, but terminates police-
initiated interrogation on any subject, the Jackson rule; founded on the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel (and not the Fifth Amendment counsel 
right as Miranda-Edwards), is ''offense-specific" and thus does not bar 
police-initiated interrogation on subjects not the subject of the current 
prosecution._54 Defense counsel should note that McNeil can be obviated 
easily (if counsel is present at the arraignment) by having the defendant 
make a clear Edwards invocation on the record. 
The Indiana Court of Appeals decided another Edwards issue in 
Rider v. State. 55 A mother's statement to police, ''We need an attorney,'' 
was urged by her twenty-year-old son to constitute an Edwards invocation 
for him as well, especially since her statement was made after consultation 
with him. The court held that only the defendant could invoke his 
Edwards right; therefore, his confession, given after full Miranda warn-
ings and waiver, was admissible.56 
The United States Supreme Court's holding in Arizona v. Fulminante51 
is unremarkable, but the dictum is a striking reversal of precedent.-The 
Court held that a confession was coerced and therefore, inadmissible. 58 
Then, however,_ the Court overruled a long line of cases and held that 
a coerced confession could be harmless error under the doctrine of 
Chapman v. California.59 This leaves a denial of counsel and a biased 
trial judge as the only two errors which cannot be harmless under 
Chapman. The Court distinguished these cases from coerced confessions 
b_y noting that they involve structural errors rather than '''trial" errors. 60 
Finally, the Court held that there was not proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt (the Chapman standard) that this particular error was harmless. 61 
52. 47S U.S. 625 (1986). 
53. McNeil, Ill S. Ct. at 2209. 
54~ ld~ at 2204. 
55. 570 N.E.2d 1286 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). 
56. /d. at 1288. 
57. Ill S. Ct. 1246 (1991). 
58. Id. at 1252. 
59. 386 u.s. 18 (1967) • 
• 60. Fulminante; 111 S. Ct. at 1251 .. 
61. Id. at 1257. Given the devastating :effect of a confession, ordinarily it will not 
be clear at all, much less clear beyond a reasonable-doubt, that the jury's hearing of an 
inadmissible confession was harmless. The decision, important as it may be to harmless-
error scholars, will probably have little practical impact. One has to imagine a case where 
the other evidence is so comp_elting (perhaps the defendant had the bad form to commit 
the crime on videotape) that the confession is clearly surplusage. 
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IV. JURY SELECTION 
The Court decided two cases further developing the rule in Batson 
v. Kentucky.62 In Powers v. Ohio,63 the Court addressed a question left 
open last term in Holland v. Illinois.64 In Holland, the Court denied a 
• 
Sixth Amendment claim of a white defendant that blacks had been 
peremptorily challenged by the prosecution in violation of Batson. In 
Batson, Justice Powell strongly intimated that had the case been argued 
as an equal protection case, the result would have been different. 65 
Writing for a seven to two majority, Justice Kennedy made good on 
that promise (threat?) in Powers. The opinion notes that the equal 
protection interests of the jurors themselves (well beyond the idea in 
Batson that the defendant's equal protection rights were- violated), are 
of constitutional dimension and that a white defendant has sufficient 
standing to raise those claims. 66· Thus, prosecutors must state race neutral 
reasons for peremptory challenges of racial minority jurors regardless 
of the race of the defendant.·67 
As a counterpoint to Powers, the holding in Hernandez v. New 
York68 indicates that the Court may be in a receptive mood to accept 
as "racially neutral'' prosecutors' justifications for a Batson strike. Here; 
the prosecutor struck many Spanish speaking jurors (the defendant is 
variously described as Latino and Hispanic). The prosecutor explained 
that he was not confident that these potential jurors would accept as 
final the official court interpreter for Spanish speaking witnesses. The 
Court felt that this was sufficiently ·':'race neutral'' over a strong dissent 
from three justices. 69 
V. BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT 
In Cage v. Louisiana70 the Court once again made clear that trial 
courts that embellish the meaning of ''reasonable doubt'' do so at great 
peril. In Cape, the trial court included within the standard ·'-'beyond a 
reasonable doubt" instructions: "It must be such doubt as would give 
rise to a grave uncertainty .... lt is an actual, substantial doubt"; it 
62. 476 u.s. 79 (1986). 
63. Ill S. Ct. 1364 (1991). 
64. 110 S. Ct. 803 (1990). 
65. Batson, 476 U.S~ at 100. 
66. /d. at 91. 
67. Powers, I 11 S. Ct. at 1374. The Powers decision was acknowledged by the 
Indiana Supreme Court in Holifield v. State, 572 N .E.2d 490 (Ind. 1991 )-. 
68. Ill S. Ct. 1859 (1991). 
69. /d. at 1873. 
70. Ill S. Ct. 328 (1990). 
• 
1992] CRIMINAL LAW 1167 
amounts to a ''moral, not a mathematical, certainty.'' The conviction 
was reversed per curiam.11 
VI. RAPE-SHIELD STATUTEs72 
In Michigan v. Lucas,13 the Court held that a Michigan trial court 
properly precluded evidence of a past sexual relationship between the 
defendant and the prosecutrix because the defendant had not complied 
with the notice requirement of the Michigan statute74 (which is quite 
similar to the Indiana statute75 and to Federal Rule of Evidence 412). 
VII. FAIR TRIAL 
The decision in Mu,Min v. Virginia16 reinforces the basic Burger 
Court direction in publicity cases staked out in Murphy v. Florida.'' 
Voir dire examination disclosed that eight of the twelve jurors had heard 
of the case, which was highly publicized, but that they could be impartial. 
The judge did not inquire of those who had been exposed to publicity 
as to the content of what they had read or heard. The defendant claimed 
that his Sixth Amendment fair trial rights dictated that the judge probe 
content. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that this was within the 
sound discretion of the trial court.78 The jurors must agree to judge the 
case on the evidence, and the judge must be certain they will do so. 
However, this can be done without full disclosure by each prospective 
juror as to exactly what publicity has reached him or her.79 
VIII. PRESUMPTIONS 
In Yates v. Evatt,80 the Court struck down as unconstitutional an 
instruction allowing the jury to presume the necessary malice for murder 
from either the use of a deadly weapon or from the committing of any 
71. /d. at 330._ 
72. The effect of such statutes is to render inadmissible as a matter of policy any 
evidence on the alleged victim's past -sexual conduct or reputation or opinion evidence of 
the same. The purposes ate to prevent a criminal trial for rape or other sex crimes from 
becoming a review of the victim's sexual history and, by removing such possibility, to 
encourage victims to come forth and seek help through the criminal process. 
73. 111 S. Ct. 1743 (1991). 
74. !d. at 1748. 
15. IND. CODE § 35-31-4-4 (1988). 
76. Ill S. Ct. 1899 (1991). 
77. 421 u.s. 794 (1975). 
78. Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1908~ 
19. /d. 
80. 111 S. Ct. 1884 (1991). 
• 
• 
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unlawful act. sa. (South Carolina had no felony murder statute.) The Court 
noted that juries can be instructed on a permissive inference (as opposed 
to a presumption), provided there is a sufficiently rational connection 
between the basic facts and the facts to be presumed. 82 
IX. CRVEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 
Harmelin v. Michigan83 generated deep division and long exposition 
on the ''proportionality'' aspect of the Eighth Amendment prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment. Defendant, a first offender, was 
sentenced to life with no possibility of parole for possession of 672 
grams of cocaine under a statutory sentencing mandate. The Court upheld 
the sentence as not "grossly disproportionate/'84 Two Justices would 
jettison the proportionality aspect entirely as being outside the history 
and intent of the Eighth Amendment. Five held the_ statute was not in 
fact grossly disproportionate even though it mandated the sentence with 
no case-specific findings. 
X. PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY 
Burns v. R_eed,85 a case from Delaware County, was not itself a 
criminal case, but a section 1983 action against a prosecutor. However, 
it has obvious and far~reaching consequences for those in criminal prac-
tice. A six Justice majority of the Court reinforced the total immunity 
of public prosecutors set forth in Imbler v. Pachtman86· for actions arising 
out of judicial proceedings. Thus, even though the plaintiff alleged that 
the prosecutor had been party to misleading a judge during a probable 
cause hearing, because such hearing is part and parcel of the judicial 
proceeding, absolute immunity applied. However, the plaintiff also alleged 
that the prosecutor gave improper advice to the police in advising that 
they could hypnotize the plaintiff (who was a suspect). As to this charge, 
the Court unanimously held that the prosecutor is to have only qualified 
immunity because giving advice to police during the investigative stage 
is not within the judicially connected part of the prosecutor's function. 87 
The Court noted that it was anomalous to extend total immunity to a 
prosecutor for giving legal advice to police and to give police only 
qualified immunity for following it. 88 
81. /d. at 1888. 
82. I d. at 1897. 
83. 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991). 
84. ld. at 2704. 
85. 111 S. Ct. 1934 (1991). 
86. 424 u.s. 409 (1976). 
87. Borus, Ill S. Ct. at 1943. 
88'. ld. 
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XI. DUE PROCESS 
In Schad v. Arizona, 89 a five to four Court decided an intriguing 
set of questions arising in a first degree murder prosecution. The Arizona 
murder statute, as is common, collected under the one heading, ''first-
degree murder," both premeditated killings and felony murder killings. 90 
Although this grouping is not historically unusual, no one ever seriously 
doubted that premeditated killing and felony murder were different 
crimes. Their constituent elements are clearly different.91 There was some 
evidence supporting each crime the killing was arguably premeditated 
and was alleged to have occurred during a robbery. The instructions 
did not require that the jury unanimously agree on a single theory. In 
effect, the trial court instructed the jury that these were merely t\VO 
different ways to get to the same crime first degree murder. Nor 
was the jury required to announce how it arrived at a verdict; it was 
sufficient that all twelve agreed to first degree murder. Thus, even though 
theoretically only six believed the killing was premeditated and only six 
believed it was committed during a robbery, the jury could, and did, 
convict. The Supreme Court held that there was no constitutional in-
firmity in the instruction since these were two theories which underlay 
the same offense, first-degree murder.92 This decision is truly astounding. 
It calls into question the protections afforded b,y the ''beyond a reasonable 
doubt'' protection and the usubstantial majority decisionu requirement.93 
The defendant also complained that the jury was not given the option 
of finding him guilty of robbery as a lesser included offense in con-
travention of the rule in Beck v. Alabama.!~4 Beck stands for the prop-
osition that omitting the lesser included offense choice (assuming, of 
course, it is supported by evidence) places the jury in an ali-or-nothing 
89. 111 S. Ct. 2491 (1991). 
90. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-452 (repealed 1978). 
91. First degree premeditated murder requires proof of an intent to kill plus the 
aspect of premeditation which implies an intent achieved after deliberation, thought, or 
planning. It requires no proof that the, defendant was engaging in an independent felony. 
Felony murder, on the other hand, requires no proof of intent to kill, but instead requires 
proof that death was caused by the defendant while engaging or attempting to engage in 
one of the felonies listed in the statute, such as burglary, rape, or robbery. 
92. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2505. This decision has an obvious application in Indiana. 
The Indiana murder statute, IND. CooE § 35-42-1-1 (Supp. 1991), groups under the one 
heading and statute "intentional" or "knowing" killing on the one hand and felony 
murder on the other. 
93. Until 1972, criminal juries had to be unanimous to convict. In Apodaca v. 
Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), the Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute which 
permitted conviction (or acquittal) on fewer than 12 (in that case 10). Yet, the Court's 
opinion in Apodaca made it clear that a bare majority is insufficient. 
94. 447 U.S, 625 (1980). 
• 
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posture and exerts unfair pressure toward conviction. 95 The Schad Court 
found that Beck was not controlling because the jury, though it was 
not given a robbery option, was given a second degree murder option, 
thereby taking this out of the ali-or-nothing rule. 96 This second holding 
is, of course, generated by the first and demonstrates the kind of problems 
such a holding can produce. If one begins by understanding premeditated 
first degree murder and felony murder as the same crime, then second 
degree murder surely is a lesser included offense. However, second degree 
murder is not lesser included in felony murder because felony murder 
requires no proof of intent to kill and second degree murder does. Those 
jurors (anywhere from zero to twelve) whose verdict was based on a 
felony murder theory had no lesser crime to select other than as a purely 
irrational compromise verdict. Those jurors were in precisely the posture 
that the Beck rule was designed to avoid. 
XII. CoNFRONTATION 
In Brady v. State,97 criminal law practitioners were reminded of the 
importance of basing their clients' claims on all available grounds, 
including the Indiana Constitution. State procedures which meet the 
minimal requirements of the federal constitution may not pass muster 
when examined for compliance with the requirements of the Indiana 
Constitution. The right of confrontation serves as a recent example. 
In Brady, the State sought leave to videotape the testimony of a 
child witness who was alleged to have been sexually abused. Videotaping 
such testimony was authorized by statute.98 The statute permitted a court 
to order the videotaping of a child's testimony for use at trial if, among 
other requirements, the child was the victim, was less than ten years 
old, and would be traumatized by testifying in the courtroom. Finding 
all statutory requirements to be met, the trial court ordered the child's 
testimony to be videotaped prior to trial. The testimony was taken in 
the child's home with the child, judge, prosecutor, defense counsel, 
child's mother, and video operator present. The defendant was located 
in the garage of the home and was able to see and hear the child via 
closed circuit television. The defendant could speak with his counsel by 
microphone. The child could not see or hear the defendant and was 
not aware of his presence. 
The Indiana Supreme Court first focused on the Sixth Amendment 
requirement that the accused shall enjoy the right ''to be confronted 
95. /d. at 645-46. 
96. Schad v. Arizona, 111 S. Ct. 2491, 2505 (1991). 
97. 575 N.E.2d 981 (Ind. 1991) 
98. IND. CODE § 35-37-4-8 (Supp. 1991). 
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with the witnesses against him.-''99 On this issue, the court found Maryland 
v~ Craig100 to be controlling_. In Craig, the United States Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of a similar Maryland procedure which per-
mitted the child's live testimony to be transmitted to the courtroom via 
one-way closed circuit television. 101 Craig made clear that the Confron-
tation Clause does not require an actual face-to-face encounter at trial 
in every instance. 102 Rather, the Sixth Amendment confrontation right 
is generally met if the defense is given a full and fair opportunity to 
probe through cross-examination. 103 Although the Indiana statutory pro-
cedure was slightly different than that analyzed in Craig,104 the essential 
requirements of confrontation as defined by Craig were present .. 105 
The proc_edure did not fare so well when tested against the right of 
the_ accused ''to meet the witnesses face to face'' as guaranteed by the 
Indiana Constitution.106 The court recognized that the federal confron-
tation requirement and the Indiana provision have much the same mean-
ing and share a similar history. 107 Both are designed primarily to protect 
the right of cross-examination. 108 Nevertheless, unlike the Sixth Amend-; 
ment confrontation right, the Indiana guarantee is not fulfilled by merely 
ensuring that the right to cross-examine is scrupulously honored. 109 The 
specific language guaranteeing "the right • . . to meet the witnesses face 
to face'' recognizes that face-to-face encounters do influence recollection, 
veracity, and communication.110 
Because the statutory procedure mandated that the child not b_e able 
to see or hear the accused_, those particular provisions of the statute 
99. U.S. CaNST;. amend. VI. 
100. 110 S. Ct. 3157 {1990). 
101. /d. at 3166. 
102. ld. at 3164. 
103. Id. 
104. The Maryland procedure provided for the child's live testimony to be taken 
• 
outside the courtroom and transmitted to the factfinder and defendant. The Indiana ·statute 
authorized the same procedure or, as actually employed in the instant case, videotaping 
the testimony prior to trial with the defendant separated from the child. 
1 OS. Craig holds that the presence of an oath, cross-examination, and the ability 
to observe the witnesses' demeanor, albeit by close circuit camera, are sufficient to ensure 
reliability and that adversarial probing occurs. With these attributes, the testimony is 
deemed the functional equivalent of live, in-person testimony~ Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. 
Ct. 3157, 3166 (1990). 
106. IND. CaNST. art 1, § 13. Failure to apply the face-to-face requirement in 
Circumstances such as these is nat fundamental error. Hart v. State, 518 N.E.2d 336 (Ind. 
1991). Thus, failure to assert the claim at trial precludes the claim on appeal. ld. at 338. 
107. Brady v. State, 575 N.E.2d 986, 987 (Ind. 1991). 
108. Id. at 985, 988. 
109. Id. at 988. 
110. !d. (citing IND. CONST., art 1, § 13}. 
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must fail as violative of the defendant's right to a face~to-face meeting 
with the_ witness. 111 Thus, the Indiana confrontation requirement provides 
greater protection to the accused than does its federal counterpart em-
bodied in the Sixth Amendment. 
The court noted that a face-to-face meeting could be accomplished 
by us_e of a twa-way closed circuit arrangement which would permit the 
separated witness and the accused to see one another.112 Such a procedure 
would not only satisfy the face-to-face requirement, but would also 
accomplish the essential purpose of the statute, affording protection to 
the child witness. 
XIII. TRIAL EVIDENCE 
The next significant case; Modesitt v. State, 113 also involved the 
admissibility of a child's statements in a sex abuse case. Although not 
of c_onstitutional dimension, the ruling has far-reaching effects. In Mo-
desitt, the accused was pummeled by testimony from the child's mother, 
a welfare case worker, and a psychologist regarding statements the child 
had made to each of them. The hearsay statements were admitted on 
the authority of Patterson v. State. 114 The child testified after this 
testimony was received.- She corroborated most of the acts previously 
narrated via the hearsay, but not all. She was not asked specifically 
whether she made the statements attributed to her by the other three 
witnesses nor whether the stateme-nts were true. 
The court first inquired whether the Patterson rule was abused. The 
court noted that the rationale for the Patterson holding, which permitted 
admission of prior statements as substantive evidence, was that the 
truthfulness of the statement could be tested by cross-examination of 
the declarant.115 This rationale was the basis for the Patterson requirement 
. . 
that the declarant be present and available for cross-examination. The 
rule was not intended to permit the out-of-court statements to serve as 
a substitute for direct testimony. 116 Such substitution O'Ccurred in Modesitt 
because the three witnesses told the victim's story and continually repeated 
her accusations before the victim testified.. As a result, the accused was 
denied the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant in a timely fashion 
111. /d. The offensive provisions: are subsections (c) and (f)(7) of IND_. CoDB § 35-
37-4-8 (Supp. 1991). 
112. Brady v. State~ 515 N.E.2d 980, 989 {Ind. 1991). 
113. 578 N.E.2d 649 (Ind. 1991). 
114. 324 N.E.2d 482 (Ind. 1975). Patterson permitted the admission of prior out 
of court statements, not under oath, as substantive evidence if the declarant was present 
and available for cross-examination at the time of admission. 
115. Modesitt, 518 N.E.2d at 651. 
116. /d. 
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regarding the truthfulness of the statements. Moreover, the constant 
repetition of the accusations resulted in the victim's credibility being 
established before the victim said a word. The court concluded that the 
Patterson rule had been abused and the defendant prejudiced by the 
''drumbeat repetition of the victim's original story prior to calling the 
victim to testify."u' 
The court then overruled Patterson because the simple rule first 
adopted in that case was no longer recognizable as applied. 118 Instead, 
the court adopted the content of Rule 801(d)(l)(A) of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence.119 Prior statements may be admitted as substantive evidence 
only if the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination 
concerning the statement and the statement is: (a) inconsistent with the 
declarant's testimony and was given under oath; (b) consistent with the 
declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut a charge of recent fabri-
cation, improper influence or motive; or (c) one of identification of a 
person made after perceiving the person.120 
In another case involving the admissibility of prior statements, Thomas 
v. State, 121 the issue was intertwined with the right of the accused to 
present a defense. In Thomas, the defendant sought to introduce the 
prior statements of one Nelson. Nelson allegedly bragged to others that 
he committed the robbery for which Thomas was on trial. In addition, 
other evidence existed which implicated Nelson. Specifically, early in the 
police investigation a clerk from a store near the robbery scene had 
selected Nelson's picture from a photo array and identified him as being 
present near the scene at the time of the robbery. 
Nelson was called as a witness but declined to testify and invoked 
his right against self-incrimination. Thomas then offered Nelson's prior 
statements that he committed the robbery. The trial court declined to 
admit the statements attributed to Nelson on hearsay grounds. The court 
of appeals affirmed finding that third party confessions and declarations 
against penal interest are permeated with untrustworthiness. The Indiana 
Supreme Court reversed and observed that an accused has a constitutional 
right to put on a defense122 citing Chambers v. Mississippi. 123 The court 
did not sanction the blanket admissibility or inadmissibility of declarations 
against penal interest. Rather, it concluded that declarations against penal 
interest should be admitted if corroborating circumstances clearly indicate 
117. I d. at 652. 
118. Jd. 
119. Id. at 653. 
120. /d. at 653-54. 
121. 580 N.E.2d 224 (Ind. 1991). 
122. !d. at 226. 
123. 410 u.s. 284 (1973). 
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the trustworthiness of the statement.124 This approach is the same as 
that identified in Chambers and the Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3). 
Applying this test to the facts of Thomas, the court concluded that 
corroboration was provided by the initial identification of Nelson, the 
number of people to whom he had bragged, and the detail of the 
statements in which he admitted that he had perpetrated the robbery~ 125 
Accordingly, the court found that Thomas should have been allowed to 
present Nelson's statements against his penal interest as exceptions to 
the hearsay rule. 
The last significant case to be surveyed pertaining to trial evidence 
is Hopkins v. State. 126 Hopkins deals with the admissibility of forensic 
DNA evidence. By statute, Indiana has already provided that the results 
of forensic DNA analysis are admissible without antecedent expert tes-
timony that such evidence provides a trustworthy and reliable method 
of identifying characteristics in an individual's genetic material.J27 The 
statute was passed after the events giving rise to the Hopkins case. Thus, 
some aspects of the Hopkins decision, specifically the question of whether 
the theory and techniques of DNA analysis can produce reliable results 
generally accepted in the scientific community, has been mooted by the 
statute. The Hopkins court answered this inquiry in the affirmative.128 
Notwithstanding the statute, Hopkins is important for two reasons. 
First, the court utilized the test of Frye v. United States, 129 to assess 
the reliability of the novel scientific evidence. 130 Although it utilized this 
test, the majority stopped short of holding that the Frye test is the 
required standard to be used in determining the admissibility of novel 
scientific evidence in Indiana. As it stands now, some cases, such as 
Hopkins, use the Frye test which requires general scientific acceptance 
of the theory and technique employed. Others require only a finding 
124. Thomas, 580 N .E.2d at 226. 
125. Id. at 227. 
126. 579 N.E.2d 1297 (Ind. 1991). 
127. IND. CODE § 35-37-4-13 (Supp. 1991). 
128. Hopkins, 519 N.E.2d at 1302. 
129. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
130. The Frye test, as discussed with apparent approval by the majority in Hopkins, 
has three elements: (1) "Is there a theory, which is generally accepted in the scientific 
community, which supports the conclusion that DNA forensic testing can produce reliable 
results?, (2) ''Are there techniques or experiments that currently exist that are capable 
of producing reliable results in DNA identification and which are generally accepted in 
the scientific community?" (3) "Did the testing laboratory perform the accepted scientific 
techniques in analyzing the forensic samples in this particular case?" Hopkins, 519 N.E.2d 
at 1302. This test is more stringent, as pointed out by Justice Dickson, than Federal Rule 
of Evidence 702, which does not require general scientific acceptance of the theory or 
techniques. Id. at 1306 (Dickson, J., concurring) (observing that the majority's discussion 
of Frye should not be construed as an endorsement or rejection of the Frye test). 
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that the subject matter of the .expert's opinion be. beyond the knowledge 
of lay persons and that the expert's knowledge will aid the jury.'131 
The second important aspect of Hopkins involves the issue of whether 
claimed irregularities in the DNA testing procedure actually employed 
go to the admissibility of the evidence or merely to its weight~ In Hopkins, 
the defendant asserted that irregularities had occurred. The court re-
sponded by indicating that once the trial court rules a witness qualified 
to give expert testimony as a matter of law, subsequent evaluation of 
the evidence goes only to its weight as a matter of fact. 132 Thereafter, 
on a chain of custody claim, the court indicated that ''the proponent 
is not required to exclude all possibility of tampering, but need only 
provide a reasonable assurance that the evidence remained in undisturbed 
condition.'' 133 Does this mean that proof of some irregularities such as 
the mishandling of the specimen may go to admissibility? 
Whether test procedure errors or omissions might affect more than 
the weight to be given the evidence and actually determine admissibility 
was addressed again in Davidson v. Indiana. 134 In Davidson, the ad-
missibility of DNA evidence was again challenged on the ground that 
irregularities had occurred in the test procedures. Again, the court in-
dicated that irregularities in the test procedures go to the weight of the 
evidence, 135 but then added, "[W]hile it might be that substantiated 
irregularities would be a basis for prohibiting admission of test results, 
the list of irregularities [defendant] Davidson perceives do not cause us 
to believe the evidence was erroneously admitted. u 136 Thus, the fact 
finder is still out on the question of whether some test irregularities 
might affect admissibility and if so, the nature of those irregularities, 
the burden allocation, and the quantum of proof necessary to establish 
the same. 
XIV. SENTENCING 
In Slocumb v. State, 137 the court dealt with a new question of law 
concerning habitual offender sentencing and Indiana Code 35-50-2-S(h), 
which provides: ''A person may not b,e sentenced as an habitual offender 
under this section if all the felonies relied upon for sentencing the person 
as an habitual offender are class D felonies." 138 Slocumb argued that 
• 
131. See id. at 1305-06 (Dickson J ., concurring). 
132. /d. 
133. Id. at 1304, 
134. 580 N.E.2d ,238 (Ind., 1991). 
135. /d. at 243. 
136. Id. 
137. 573 N.E.2d 427 (Ind. 1991). 
138. IND. CoDE § 35-50-2-S(h) (Supp. 1991). 
• 
1176 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:1157 
this statute precluded a thirty year enhancement of sentence if the prior 
convictions are from other states and the penalty imposed for each 
conviction was within the sentencing range for Indiana class D felonies. 
It is interesting to note that the court went out of its way to address 
this issue. Regardless of the resolution to this question, Slocumb's sen-
tence had to be vacated because the State failed to prove that the prior 
convictions were felonies. Thus, the evidence was insufficient to establish 
that he was a habitual offender .139 Notwithstanding the presence of this 
outcome determinative issue, the court addressed the effect of section 
35-50-2-S(h) on Slocumb's case. 
The court's discussion of the statute seems to go beyond the foreign 
versus domestic felony grading issue and indicates that when all prior 
felonies are at the class D level, the accused is not eligible for a thirty 
year enhancement regardless of the nature of the present offense. 140 Some 
vagueness remains for two reasons. First, Slocumb's current offense was 
a class D felony; thus, the court may not have believed it necessary to 
state that the statutory prohibition only applied if the current offense, 
as well as the prior convictions, were class D felonies. Second, such a 
construction would leave an apparent gap in the law. Note that the 
statute dealing with class D habitual offenders seems to require that the 
current offense, as well as all prior convictions, be class D felonies. 141 
Thus, the offender with a class C felony charge, as the current 
offense, and a history of D felony convictions, cannot be determined 
to be a class D habitual offender. Now assume that Slocumb precludes 
a thirty year enhancement when all the prior offenses are class D felonies, 
regardless of the nature of the current charge. The result is that the 
defendant currently charged with a class A, B, or C felony who has a 
history of class D felony offenses is not eligible for any enhancement. 
Regardless of the court's intent, Slocumb gives rise to such an argument. 
In another sentencing case, Hensley v. State, 142 the court of appeals 
held that statements made during a "clean-up statement" which the 
accused provided as part of a failed plea agreement were not admissible 
at sentencing.143 The court emphasized that the rule prohibiting the 
admission of such statements in evidence is a substantive rule and not 
139. Slocumb, 513 N.E.2d at 429. 
140. Id. at428 ("[T]he apparent purpose of these amendments was to render ineligible 
for 30-year enhancements those persons whose prior offenses were the least serious fel-
onies.") 
141. IND. ConE § 35-50-2-7.1 (Supp. 1991). See id. § 35-50-2-7.1(c) (providing that 
the eight year enhancement shall be added to the sentence imposed under Section 7 of 
the chapter). Section 7 deals with class D felony sentencing. · 
142. 573 N.E.2d 913 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). 
143. Id. at 918. 
• 
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merely an evidentiary rule.-Thus, admission of such statements is barred 
at sentencing as well as trial. 144 
As a final note regarding sentencing, the legislature extended the 
period for modification of sentence without the approval of the pros-
ecuting attorney from 180 days to 365 days.145 This modification probably 
is entitled to retroactive effect on the theory that an extension of time 
to do that which is perntitted already is procedural and therefore, outside 
the general rule that the law in effect at the time_ the offense was 
committed controls sentencing. 146 
XV. PosT CoNVICTION 
The road to federal habeas review becomes more difficult with each 
successive term_ of the United States Supreme Court. This year was no 
exception. The Court reviewed several cases involving those dreaded 
omissions known as procedural defaults. 
In Coleman v. Thompson 141 counsel filed a notice of appeal to secure 
review of the- denial of state habeas corpus relief three days late_. The 
State moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely. The parties filed briefs 
on the subject of the dismissal motion and on the merits. The state 
appellate court issued a summary o-rder granting dismissal. The order 
did not discuss the grounds for dismissal except to state, after identifying 
all the papers filed, ''Upon consideration whereof, the motion to dismiss 
is granted.'' 148 
At the Supreme Court,: Coleman argued that the plain statement 
rule of Harris v. Reed149 controlled. The Harris Court held that when 
a defendant fails to raise a claim in accordance with state procedures 
but did present the claim to a state court, the state court ruling rejecting 
the claim will not be viewed as resting on the procedural default unless 
the state court clearly indicates that it relied on that ground. tso Harris 
unequivocally provided that a procedural default will not bar federal 
review unless the last state court rendering judgment clearly and expressly 
states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar .'151 
In response, the Court found that ''[a] predicate to the application 
of the Harris presumption is that the decision of the last state court to 
which petitioner presented his federal claims must fairly appear to rest 
144. Id. 
l4S. IND. ConE § 35-38-1.:17 (Supp. l991). 
146. Willis v. State, 567 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). 
147. Ill S. Ct. 2546 (1991). 
148. /d. at 2553. 
149. 489 u.s. 255 (1989}. 
ISO. /d. at 263. 
151. ld .. 
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primarily on federal law ot to be interwoven with federal law." 152 On 
examination, the factual predicate .did not appear to exist in Coleman. 
That is, it did not appear that the dismissal order rested on, or was 
interwoven with, federal law. 153 As a consequence, Coleman was not 
entitled to the Harris presumption. Coleman simply had defaulted under 
state law. 
Coleman sought to excuse the procedural default by arguing that 
the omission occurred because of attorney error. The Court found that 
because Coleman had no right to counsel to pursue his state habeas 
corpus appeal, any attorney error regarding that appeal cannot constitute 
cause to excuse the procedural default. 154 Counsel's ineffectiveness will 
constitute cause only if it is an independent constitutional violation. 155 
Absent a constitutional right to counsel, there can be no independent 
constitutional violation because of counsel's ineffectiveness. 
The Harris plain statement rule was limited further in Ylst v. Nun-
nemaker.156 In Ylst, the Court faced a scenario in which the last state 
court denied relief summarily without stating that a state procedural bar 
was the basis for the judgment. However, an intermediate appellate court 
explicitly found a state procedural bar.157 In Ylst, the plain statement 
rule was modified again by the following presumption: ''[W]here there 
has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later 
unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim 
rest upon the same ground.'' 158 Thus, if the earlier decision addressed 
the merits of federal claims and denied reli~f, a later unexplained denial 
will be presumed to rest on federal law. On the other hand, if the 
earlier opinion finds that the defendant is not entitled to review on the 
merits because of a state procedural bar, a subsequent unexplained denial 
will be presumed to rest on the same grounds, i.e., the procedural 
default. The presumption is rebuttable by strong evidence.159 
In another significant decision, McCleskey v. Zant, 160 the Court 
adopted a new rule redefining the doctrine known as "abuse of the 
writ.'' At McCleskey's state court murder trial, another jail inmate, 
Evans, testified that McCleskey boasted about the killing. After his direct 
appeal, McCleskey sought state habeas corpus relief on the ground that 
152. Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2559 (1991). 
153. /d. 
154. /d. at 2568. 
155. Id. at 2567. 
156. Ill S. Ct. 2590 (1991). 
157. /d. at 2592. 
158. /d. at 2594. 
159. /d. at 2595. 
160. 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991). 
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the statements to Evans were elicited in a situation created by the State 
to induce him to make statements without the assistance of counsel in 
violation of Massiah v. United States. 161 The state habeas court denied 
relief and the Georgia Supreme Court denied discretionary review. 
Thereafter, McCleskey sought federal habeas corpus relief but did 
not raise the Massiah issue. Ultimately, that petition was denied. One 
month before filing his second petition, McCleskey finally received a 
twenty-one page statement that Evans had made to police two weeks 
before McCleskey's original trial began. 162 In addition, McCleskey located 
the jailer in whose office the statement from Evans was taken. At the 
hearing on the second federal petition, the jailer testified that he had 
been asked to move Evans close to McCleskey. 
In the end, McCleskey's claim was of no avait The Supreme Court 
found that he had ~'abused the writ"' by failing to assert the Massiah_ 
claim in his first federal petition. 163 The claim was available at that time 
as was demonstrated by its inclusion in his earlier state habeas corpus 
petition. The Court found that the abuse of the writ do-ctrine was not 
limited to cases involving deliberate abandonment. 164 Anticipating crit-
icism that such a limitation was imposed by Sanders v. United States; 165 
the Court asserted that Sanders discussed deliberate abandonment as one 
example of conduct that results in forfeiture. 166 
Under the McCleskey rule, a petitioner can abuse the writ by raising 
a claim in a second petition that he could have raised in his first petition, 
regardless of whether the omission was deliberate. 167 To excuse such an 
omission, the petitioner must show cause and prejudice, as we now 
understand those terms, or show that a fundamental miscarriage of 
justice would result from a failure to entertain the claim. 168 A fundamental 
miscarriage of justice occurs when an innocent man suffers an uncon-
stitutional loss of liberty. 169 
XVI. DEATH PENALTY 
Perhaps the most significant Indiana development in the area of 
death penalty law and practice was the amendment of Criminal Rule 
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24 to provide standards for the appointment of counsel and for 
compensation of counsel. 170 Under the new rule, upon a finding of 
indigency, the court shall appoint two qualified attorneys for trial. 
To qualify as lead counsel, one must have at least five years of 
criminal litigation experience with no fewer than five completed felony 
jury trials and at least one capital case. Co-counsel must have at least 
three years experience with at least three felony jury trials tried to 
completion. Both counsel must have completed at least twelve hours 
Qf training in the defense of capital cases within two years of the 
appointment.171 The rule also provides that trial counsel shall be ap-
pointed to serve as appellate counsel, if qualified. 172 Appellate counsel 
must have three years experience in criminal litigation and have ap-
pellate experience in at least three felony appeals within the five year 
period prior to appointment. The training requirements applicable to 
trial counsel must also be met by appellate counsel. 173 
When appointing trial or appellate counsel, the court is required 
to assess the nature and volume of counsel's workload to assure_ that 
sufficient attention can be directed to the defense of the capital case. 174 
Specific workload limitations are imposed on salaried or contractual 
public defenders appointed as trial counsel in capital cases. Such a 
defender may be appointed only if his or. her workload will not exceed 
twenty open felony cases while the capital case is pending; no new 
cases may be assigned to such counsel within thirty days of the trial 
setting in the capital case. 175 Similarly, if appellate counsel is under 
contract to provide other defense services, no new cases for appeal 
shall be as-signed to that counsel until the brief is filed in the capital 
case. 116 
Compensation for counsel is set at an hourly rate of seventy dollars 
per hour for all necessary and reasonable services, 177 with adjustments 
to the compensation paid contract employees for other defense services 
to reflect the limitations on case assignments. 178 The rule also provides 
that trial counsel s,hall be provided with sufficient funds for inves-
tigative, expert, and other services necessary to present a defense at 
every stage of the proceeding, including sentencing. 179 
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In case law developments, the United States Supreme Court over-
ruled Booth v. Maryland, 180 and South Carolina v. Gathers, 181 the 
victim impact cases. This reversal of recent precedent came in Payne 
v. Tennessee, 182 in which the Court held that the Eighth Amendment 
does not bar the admission of victim impact evidence or prosecutorial 
argument on the subject. 183 In Payne, the Court con~luded that the 
reasoning of Booth and Gathers was flawed. Both were described as 
being premised on the notion that victim impact evidence does not 
reflect on the defendant's blameworthiness and that only evidence 
relating to blameworthiness is relevant in a capital sentencing. 184 The 
Court concluded that evidence of the harm inflicted, i.e., the impact 
on the victim, has been and is an important factor in determining the 
appropriate punishment to be imposed in criminal cases.185 In the 
Court's view, a state could conclude that evidence of the specific harm 
caused by the accused is relevant to the defendant's moral culpability 
and blameworthiness. 186 This being the case, there is no reason to 
treat such evidence differently than other relevant evidence; at least, 
the Eighth Amendment erects no such bar. 187 If victim impact evidence 
is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, 
the Due Process Clause provides the vehicle for relief. 188 
XVII. CONCLUSION 
Federal and Indiana courts continue to hear a high volume of criminal 
cases. The overall direction of the trend, manifested both in court 
decisions and legislative enactments, continues to be toward providing 
greater scope to criminal law enforcement and a narrowing of consti-
tutional due process interests. However, as the Supreme Court of the 
United States narrows constitutional rights, the Indiana Supreme Court 
clearly maintains the momentum established over the past several years 
to expanding protections under the state constitution. That document 
seems slowly to be rising from its torpor. 
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